Authors' reply [to comments on "A fuzzy approach to strategic games"]

For original paper see ibid., vol.7, no.6, p.634-42 (1999). We have no problem with the comments presented by Mathew and Kaimal (see ibid., p.415, 2005) regarding the investigation discussed in our original paper. The fact is that the general result in the investigated cases, that for a prisoner in both situations (noncooperative and selfish) the optional strategy is still to "confess" irrespective of the strategic choice made by the opponent party, really is in agreement with our original discussions. We thank the authors of the comments for their interest in our work, which has been recently expanded into "software testing via fuzzy strategic games" as well as "fighting terrorism in cyberspace using fuzzy strategic games." It is interesting to note that, especially in these two applications, the comments made by Mathew and Kaimal may make a significant impact.