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Fair-efficient threshold parameters selection in call admission control for CDMA mobile multimedia communications using game theoretic framework

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2 Author(s)
Virapanicharoen, J. ; Dept. of Electr. Eng., Chulalongkorn Univ., Bangkok, Thailand ; Benjapolakul, W.

The call admission control (CAC) for code-division multiple-access (CDMA) mobile multimedia communications is one of the most important engineering issues since it belongs to the category of resource management and the radio spectrum is a very scarce resource. As efficiency is an important performance issue of CAC in the mobile networks with multimedia services, the concept of fairness among services should also be considered. Game theory provides an appropriate framework for formulating such fair and efficient CAC problem. Thus, in this paper, a selection method of fair-efficient threshold parameters of the CAC scheme for the asymmetrical traffic case in CDMA mobile multimedia communications based on the framework of game theory (both of noncooperative and cooperative games) is proposed. The proposed scheme provides fair and efficient resource allocation for multiple classes of traffic, and also guarantees the proper priority mechanism. Call classes are viewed as the players of a game. Utility function of the player is defined as the bandwidth utilization. The numerical results show that there is a unique equilibrium point of the noncooperative game for any given offered load. The results also indicate that, for the cooperative game, the Nash solution with the origin (0,0) as the starting point of the bargaining problem can achieve higher total utilization compared with the previous control method while at the same time providing fairness by satisfying a set of fairness axioms.

Published in:

Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, 2005. CCNC. 2005 Second IEEE

Date of Conference:

3-6 Jan. 2005