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Cournot Equilibrium in Price-Capped Two-Settlement Electricity Markets

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4 Author(s)
Jian Yao ; University of California at Berkeley ; B. Willems ; S. S. Oren ; I. Adler

We compare two alternative mechanisms for capping prices in two-settlement electricity markets. With sufficient lead time and competitive entry opportunities, forward market prices are implicitly capped by competitive pressure of potential entry that will occur when forward prices rise above a certain level. Another more direct approach is to cap spot prices through regulatory intervention. In this paper we explore the implications of the two alternative mechanisms in a two settlement Cournot equilibrium framework. We formulate the market equilibrium as a stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) capturing congestion effects, probabilistic contingencies and market power. As an illustrative test case we use the 53-bus Belgian electricity network with representative generator cost but hypothetical demand and ownership assumptions. When compared to two-settlement systems without price caps we find that either of the price capping alternatives results in reduced forward contracting. Furthermore the reduction in spot prices due to forward contracting is smaller.

Published in:

Proceedings of the 38th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences

Date of Conference:

03-06 Jan. 2005