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How to misuse AODV: a case study of insider attacks against mobile ad-hoc routing protocols

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2 Author(s)
Peng Ning ; Comput. Sci. Dept., North Carolina State Univ., Raleigh, NC, USA ; Kun Sun

We present a systematic analysis of insider attacks against mobile ad-hoc routing protocols, using the Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol as an example. It identifies a number of attack goals and then studies how to achieve these goals through misuses of the routing messages. To facilitate the analysis, we classify the insider attacks into two categories: atomic misuses and compound misuses. Atomic misuses are performed by manipulating a single routing message, which cannot be further divided; compound misuses are composed of combinations of atomic misuses and possibly normal uses of the routing protocol. The analysis results reveal several classes of insider attacks, including route disruption, route invasion, node isolation, and resource consumption. We also describe simulation results that demonstrate the impact of these attacks.

Published in:

Information Assurance Workshop, 2003. IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics Society

Date of Conference:

18-20 June 2003