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During the 1982 invasion of southern Lebanon, the Israeli Air Force faced the problem of neutralizing the massive Syrian air defense network in the Bekka Valley as a step in gaining air control in the area. They accomplished this, in a matter of days, without the loss of a single aircraft, while inflicting a loss of over 80 aircraft on the Syrian Air Force. The key to this smashing tactical success was the tactic used to suppress the extensive air defense network. The Israelis used remotely piloted vehicles (RPV's) for the high-risk elements of their tactical plan. RPV's conducted in-depth reconnaissance to spot and fingerprint the search and fire control radars in the valley and on adjacent mountainsides and to locate surface-to-air missile (SAM) launch sites. When the attack started, the first waves were RPV's configured to appear as attack aircraft and draw first fire. As the engagement started, manned attack fighter-bombers used antiradiation missiles (ARM's) and other smart ordnance to destroy enemy radars and launch sites as they were engaging the RPV's. While there was some loss of the low-cost RPV's, there were no losses to the Israeli aircraft. A "hornet's nest" of weapons and radars had been effectively neutralized without loss and in a period of a few hours. Recent statements of current U.S. Naval doctrine  emphasize a forward area strategy of naval action in or near enemy waters. The Soviet Navy in turn has been attributed as having a "bastion" strategy  to operate their SLBM force in Arctic waters and heavily defend the sea approaches to these waters. In other words, we postulate that they will create a "hornet's nest" and the U.S. Navy would intend to attack it, a Naval "Bekka Valley." This article examines the potential need for unmanned systems in the execution of the forward-area strategy. Emphasis is upon medium- and long-range submersibles capable of autonomous operation.