By Topic

The Nash solution of an advertising differential game: Generalization of a model by Leitmann and Schmitendorf

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$33 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

1 Author(s)
G. Feichtinger ; Technical University, Vienna, Austria

In this paper the differential game between two profit maximizing firms considered in [15] is extended to the case of general (concave) effectiveness functions of advertising. For this model, a phase portrait analysis of Nash equilibrium solutions is carried out providing qualitative insights into the structure of optimal advertising rates. Applying this analysis to the Leitmann-Schmitendorf advertising model, we obtain more detailed information on the structure of the optimal controls. Moreover, Nash-optimal solutions are derived for infinite duration of the game.

Published in:

IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control  (Volume:28 ,  Issue: 11 )