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Bayes equilibrium on negotiation means transaction of the power market long-term contract

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4 Author(s)
Wang Peng ; Dept. of Electr. Power Eng., North China Electr. Power Univ., Beijing, China ; Wu Yan-Hong ; Yang Hua-Chun ; He Ren-mu

In the power generation market, the long-term contract is one of the common and important choices of power generation company and transaction center to pursue benefits and evade risks. In this paper, in virtue of the resource allocation means in the economic activities, the means of forming a long-term contract is categorized into 3 classes; appointment means, negotiation means and bidding (sealed auction) means. This dissertation adopts such concepts as Bayes equilibrium of incorporative game theory, discusses the rational conditions of contract price formation in the negotiation means, and lays an important foundation for the transactions and supervision of such contract patterns.

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Power System Technology, 2002. Proceedings. PowerCon 2002. International Conference on  (Volume:3 )

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