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Constrained competitive Cournot equilibrium with incomplete information in electricity market

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3 Author(s)
Zhang, Y.B. ; Sch. of Electr. Eng., Xi''an Jiaotong Univ., China ; Luo, X.J. ; Xue, J.Y.

This paper presents a model and a solving method for obtaining the expected Cournot equilibrium state of power outputs for generation companies under the technical constraint conditions. In this paper, we assume each generation company knows the market inverse demand function and has several estimated cost functions for each generation unit of the other companies. A modified Cournot noncooperative game model is used to determine the expected equilibrium state of the oligopoly electricity market. The expected equilibrium state can be obtained using the Kuhn-Tucker (KT) vector optimization theorem. An example has been done to demonstrate the model. The test results show the proposed methodology is a useful tool for generation companies to optimize their resources and make their decisions.

Published in:

Power System Technology, 2002. Proceedings. PowerCon 2002. International Conference on  (Volume:4 )

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