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Influence of auction rules on short-term generation scheduling

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3 Author(s)
Marmiroli, Marta ; Power Syst. & Transmission Eng. Center, Mitsubishi Electr. Corp., Tokyo, Japan ; Tsukamoto, Yukitoki ; Iba, K.

This paper presents a new approach for generation scheduling in a deregulated electricity market. Two types of auction rule, i.e., discriminatory and uniform-price are modeled and compared to evaluate their efficiency and equitability in the open market. In this research, an independent system operator is responsible for coordinating the competitive auction and dispatching generators in a feasible and efficient way. Therefore, the operational constraints and economic characteristics are simultaneously evaluated in the planning process. Given that the operator is considered as a single buyer, the first objective of the operator is to minimize total payment for the generation companies. In this work, a sequential method, in which commitment decisions are based on economic parameters, is applied to get an efficient and equitable generation schedule. The numerical results show the advantages of discriminatory auction rule

Published in:

Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, 1999. IEEE  (Volume:2 )

Date of Conference:

1999