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On the complexity of two-player win-lose games

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3 Author(s)
Abbott, T. ; Comput. Sci. & Artificial Intelligence Lab., Massachusetts Inst. of Technol., Cambridge, MA, USA ; Kane, D. ; Valiant, P.

The efficient computation of Nash equilibria is one of the most formidable challenges in computational complexity today. The problem remains open for two-player games. We show that the complexity of two-player Nash equilibria is unchanged when all outcomes are restricted to be 0 or 1. That is, win-or-lose games are as complex as the general case for two-player games.

Published in:

Foundations of Computer Science, 2005. FOCS 2005. 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on

Date of Conference:

23-25 Oct. 2005