Applying evolutionary game theory to auction mechanism design
Byde, A.
HP Labs, Bristol, UK;
This paper appears in: E-Commerce, 2003. CEC 2003. IEEE International Conference on
Publication Date: 24-27 June 2003
On page(s): 347- 354
ISSN:
ISBN: 0-7695-1969-5
INSPEC Accession Number: 7726575
Posted online: 2003-07-09 09:27:31.0
Abstract
We describe an evolution-based method for evaluating auction mechanisms, and apply it to a space of mechanisms including the standard first-price and second-price sealed bid auctions. We replicate results known already in the auction theory literature regarding the suitability of different mechanisms for different bidder environments, and extend the literature by establishing the superiority of novel mechanisms over standard mechanisms, for commonly occurring scenarios. Thus this paper simultaneously extends auction theory, and provides a systematic method for further such extensions.
Index
Terms
Available to subscribers and IEEE members.
References
Available to subscribers and IEEE members.
Citing Documents
Available to subscribers and IEEE members.
Cart
