Cascading failures of spatially embedded cyber physical power system under localized attacks

Information system make the power grid more efficient and smarter, forming the cyber physical power system (CPPS). In the real world, infrastructures are always spatially embedded in the 2D or 3D space where each component has a coordinate. Under the circumstances, some external attacks may destroy a fraction of components within certain region instead of global damage, i.e., localized attack. In this paper, adopting the IEEE-39 bus system, we analyze the spatial CPPS model and study the impact of attacking radium rattack on cascading failures. Results show that with the increase of rattack, the load loss will first increase and then decrease and finally approach to its maximum value. In addition, through varying the coordinates of attacking center, we identify different key areas. Results show that the number of failed components will not play a role on blackout, and different key areas will be obtained when rattack varies. These findings may be helpful to understand real power systems.