Dynamic Spectrum Leasing With Two Sellers

This paper studies dynamic spectrum leasing in a cognitive radio network. There are two spectrum sellers, who are two primary networks, each with an amount of licensed spectrum bandwidth. When a seller has some unused spectrum, it would like to lease the unused spectrum to secondary users. A coordinator helps to perform the spectrum leasing stage-by-stage. As the two sellers may have different leasing periods, there are three epochs, in which seller 1 has spectrum to lease in Epochs II and III, while seller 2 has spectrum to lease in Epochs I and II. Each seller needs to decide how much spectrum it should lease to secondary users in each stage of its leasing period, with a target at revenue maximization. It is shown that, when the two sellers both have spectrum to lease (i.e., in Epoch II), the spectrum leasing can be formulated as a noncooperative game. Nash equilibria of the game are found in closed form. Solutions of the two sellers in their leasing periods are then derived.