Evolutionary programming of product design policies. An agent-based model study

The new product development and operational marketing literature grapples with incorporation of uncertainty on the market and technological structure discovered over time. In contrast, market and technological uncertainty is at the heart of neo-Schumpeterian agent-based models used in evolutionary innovation economics. We present a novel agent-based model in which designer agents design products to cater to services desired by user agents. In this model, designers imitate and experiment with design policies with which they engage in contests to puzzle together products. This model thus `evolutionary programs' a commendable design policy for the given market and technological structure. We experimentally vary the segmentation of the market and the density of technological relationships ex ante unknown to designer agents and then study the emerging `winning' design policies. Preliminary simulation results reveal that there is no `one-size-fits-all' design policy, but that winning design policies are tailored to the structure of market and technology following particular rationales. Given that we present a novel model, we critically reflect on the operationalizations and propose further refinements.