Direct Minimum-Uplift Model for Pricing Pool-Based Auction With Network Constraints

Auctions with non-convexities, as considered in this paper, use a multi-period optimal power flow (OPF) model based on generators' offers to calculate efficient schedules. The standard locational marginal prices (LMPs) may not support these schedules and uplifts are needed to help the generators break even. This paper presents a direct minimum-uplift (DMU) pricing model, which is formulated as a mixed integer linear programming problem with uplift minimization objective. New DMU prices are major variables constrained with decomposition formula based on shift factors, similar to the actual practice of developing LMPs. The remaining constraints reflect the generators' profits and uplifts modeled as functions of the DMU prices. The main feature of the DMU model is individual rationality attained in pool-based auction, under prices properly reflecting network constraints, complemented with minimum uplifts. The model is validated on several cases, including the IEEE 24-node system.