Method for designing multi-channel RNS architectures to prevent power analysis SCA

Power analysis attacks are one of the most common Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs), proven to be extremely successful even on protected embedded devices. This paper proposes the use of a Residue Number System (RNS) architecture with randomly permuted moduli sets to implement the Double-and-Add computation, which is proven as the most susceptible operation in Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). The proposed solution randomly permutes the moduli sets, allowing randomized power traces, significantly removing the correlation between the power dissipation and the secret key and eliminating the need for the intermediate conversion to binary required in the state-of-the-art. Architectures obtained for a 90nm standard cell technology suggest that a significant power analysis resistance is achieved for the Double-and-Add circuitry, incurring an extra performance cost of 3 times compared to the related state-of-the-art.