An efficient and confirmed protocol for authenticated key agreement

The Diffie-Hellman protocol is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack; the MTI group has recovered this vulnerability with shortage in providing key confirmation. The Pour key agreement system was invented to provide the key confirmation property while it doesn't 't satisfy the key control attributes. A previous proposal, to circumvent all these problems, was proposed by the authors of this paper, aimed to provide the key control attributes, but unfortunately it doesn't support forward secrecy in case of long-term keys compromise. In this paper, we propose a secure two-pass AKC (authenticated key agreement with key confirmation) protocol in the asymmetric (public-key) setting, based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement, and we prove that it has the desirable attributes, which are discussed through. The proposal has been described in the discrete logarithmic setting over a finite field. We also compare our new protocol with others in terms of computational cost and security properties.