Evaluation of Localization Attacks on Power-Modulated Challenge–Response Systems

Location information should be verifiable in order to support new computing and information services. In this paper, we adapt the classical challenge-response method for authentication to the task of verifying an entity's location. Our scheme utilizes a collection of transmitters, and adapts the power allocations across these transmitters to verify a user's claimed location. This strategy, which we call a power-modulated challenge response, is able to be used with existing. wireless sensor networks. First, we propose a direct method, where some transmitters are selected to send ldquochallengesrdquo that the claimant node should be able to witness based on its claimed location, and for which the claimant node must correctly respond to in order to prove its location. Second, we reverse the strategy by presenting an indirect method, where some transmitters send challenges that the claimant node should not be able to witness. Then, we present a signal-strength-based method, where the node responds with its received signal strength and thereby provides improved location verification. To evaluate our schemes, we examine different adversarial models for the claimant, and characterize the performance of our power-modulated challenge response schemes under these adversarial models. Further, we propose a new localization attack, where a set of nodes collaborates to pretend that there is a node at the claimed location. This collusion attack can do tremendous harm to localization and the performance of the aforementined methods under collusion attack are explained. Finally, we propose the use of a rotational directional power-modulated challenge response, where directional antennas are used to defend against collusion attacks.