Cooperation in radio resource sharing games of adaptive strategies

The paper focuses on the competition for radio resources in overlapping, quality-of-service supporting, wireless networks, with the help of a stage-based game model. The application of such economic concepts allows us to analyze the problem with the help of game models. We focus on solutions based on emerging equilibria. Within radio resource sharing games, payoff-maximizing players represent wireless networks that share radio resources with other wireless networks. Players can improve their outcome by dynamically adapting behaviors when interacting. Different strategies that determine player's behaviors are evaluated. Traffic requirements of the applications determine whether a strategy should pursue cooperative behaviors to increase payoffs. Directly related to the question of whether cooperation is a predictable and emerging outcome in a longer interaction is the question about how players may mutually motivate each other not to deviate from cooperation. We apply adaptive strategies, i.e., strategies that set behaviors dynamically from stage to stage, based on other player's behaviors.