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A Pricing Mechanism for Resource Allocation in Wireless Multimedia Applications

Fangwen Fu   Stoenescu, T.M.   van der Schaar, M.  
California Univ., Los Angeles
This paper appears in: Selected Topics in Signal Processing, IEEE Journal of
Publication Date: Aug. 2007
Volume: 1 , Issue: 2
On page(s): 264 - 279
ISSN: 1932-4553
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1109/JSTSP.2007.901519
Current Version Published: 2007-07-23

Abstract
We consider the problem of multiuser resource allocation for wireless multimedia applications deployed by autonomous and noncollaborative wireless stations (WSTAs). Existing resource allocation solutions for WLANs are not network-aware and do not take into account the selfish behavior of individual WSTAs. Specifically, the selfish WSTAs can manipulate the network by untruthfully representing their private information (i.e., video characteristics, experienced channel conditions, and deployed streaming strategies). This often results in inefficient resource allocations. To overcome this obstacle, we present a pricing mechanism for message exchanges between the WSTAs and the Central Spectrum Moderator (CSM). The messages represent network-aware resource demands and corresponding prices. We prove that the message exchanges reach the Nash equilibrium and that the resulting equilibrium messages generate allocations which are efficient, budget balanced, and satisfy voluntary participation. The simulation results verify that these properties hold when the WSTAs behave strategically. Additionally, we evaluate the impact of initial prices and network congestion level on the convergence rate of message exchanges.

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