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		<title><![CDATA[ Security & Privacy, IEEE - new TOC ]]></title>
		<link>http://null</link>
		<description>TOC Alert for Publication# 8013 </description>
		<year>2013</year>
		<month>May      </month>
		<day>20</day>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Front Cover]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493337]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Front Cover]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493337]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>c1</startPage>
			<endPage>c1</endPage>
			<fileSize>1577</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Table of Contents]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493315]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Table of Contents]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493315]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>1</startPage>
			<endPage>2</endPage>
			<fileSize>1192</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Breaking-in Research]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493316]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Great research, by definition, will have valuable impacts. But just because an activity is undertaken by a researcher and has valuable impacts does not make it great research&amp;#x2014;or even research.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493316]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>3</startPage>
			<endPage>4</endPage>
			<fileSize>379</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Schneider, Fred B.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Masthead]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493317]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Masthead]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493317]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>5</startPage>
			<endPage>5</endPage>
			<fileSize>245</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Security, Privacy, Policy, and Dependability Roundup]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493318]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Our news briefs cover the latest in security, privacy, policy, and dependability.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493318]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>6</startPage>
			<endPage>7</endPage>
			<fileSize>173</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Garber, Lee;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Silver Bullet Talks with Steve Bellovin]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493320]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Gary McGraw interviews Steve Bellovin, professor of computer science at Columbia University and CTO of the Federal Trade Commission. They discuss technology transfer, how code has gotten better but the threat model has changed, whether mobile security is just a repackaging of the same security problem, the very first days of Usenet, and the famed Evil Bit. Hear the full podcast at www.computer.org/silverbullet. Show links, notes, and an online discussion can be found at www.cigital.com/silverbullet.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493320]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>8</startPage>
			<endPage>11</endPage>
			<fileSize>496</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[McGraw, Gary;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Crossing the Great Divide: Transferring Security Technology from Research to the Market]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493322]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[The challenges of transferring cybersecurity technologies are varied and span a wide range from detailed technical issues to market, sales, and production issues. It often seems that there is an art to successfully crossing the great divide. Are there cybersecurity-specific issues and challenges that make technology transfer more difficult?]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493322]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>12</startPage>
			<endPage>13</endPage>
			<fileSize>499</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Benzel, Terry V.;Lipner, Steve;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Crossing the &#x0022;Valley of Death&#x0022;: Transitioning Cybersecurity Research into Practice]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493323]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[New and innovative technologies will only make a difference if they're deployed and used. It doesn't matter how visionary a technology is unless it meets user needs and requirements and is available as a product via user-acceptable channels. One of the cybersecurity research community's biggest ongoing challenges is transitioning technology into commercial or open source products available in the marketplace. This article presents an R&amp;D execution model to increase the success rate of technology transition along with several examples of successful technology transition from the US Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate's cybersecurity R&amp;D program.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493323]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>14</startPage>
			<endPage>23</endPage>
			<fileSize>1056</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Maughan, D.;Balenson, D.;Lindqvist, U.;Tudor, Z.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Building a Bridge across the Transition Chasm]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6365619]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Best practices for transitioning commercially funded research to operational environments don't always apply to government-funded cybersecurity endeavors due to constraints imposed by government regulations, certifications, and funding cycles. Most approaches for crossing this "valley of death" have been offered from the perspective of government sponsors and acquisition authorities. This article offers the perspective of an R&amp;D team that has transitioned three cybersecurity situation awareness technologies from early research to installations in the US Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense. The authors describe the techniques they used to build a bridge across the transition chasm.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6365619]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>24</startPage>
			<endPage>33</endPage>
			<fileSize>1018</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[D'Amico, A.;O'Brien, B.;Larkin, M.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Federated Identity Management - We Built It; Why Won't They Come?]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6336740]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Solutions for federated identity management (FIM) are maturing; however, the adoption rate of this technology hasn't been as high as expected. The authors conducted and analyzed eleven semistructured interviews with representatives from the Norwegian oil and gas industry to learn more about the perceived benefits and challenges of FIM adoption. Their results show that some benefits of FIM adoption are offset by its challenges.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6336740]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>34</startPage>
			<endPage>41</endPage>
			<fileSize>493</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Jensen, J.;Jaatun, M.G.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Crossing the Great Divide: From Research to Market]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493324]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[A successful technologist who transferred from within, a start-up company founder who moved from university research to Microsoft, a venture investor, and an open source evangelist gathered recently for a roundtable discussion with guest editor Terry V. Benzel about key questions and lessons learned. The discussion ranged from what makes it work, how to measure the benefits, surprises, and whether they would do it again. Although everyone in the group had a different experience, they were largely in agreement on the key issues of technology transfer and all agreed that they would gladly do it again.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493324]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>42</startPage>
			<endPage>46</endPage>
			<fileSize>839</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Benzel, Terry V.;O'Brien, Eric;Rodriguez, Robert;Arbaugh, William;Sebes, John;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Protecting Your Software Updates]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6307797]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[As described in many blog posts and the scientific literature, exploits for software vulnerabilities are often engineered on the basis of patches, which often involves the manual or automated identification of vulnerable code. The authors evaluate how this identification can be automated with the most frequently referenced diffing tools, demonstrating that for certain types of patches, these tools are indeed effective attacker tools. But they also demonstrate that by using binary code diversification, the effectiveness of the tools can be diminished severely, thus severely closing the attacker's window of opportunity.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6307797]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>47</startPage>
			<endPage>54</endPage>
			<fileSize>588</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Coppens, B.;De Sutter, B.;De Bosschere, K.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[LTE/SAE Security Issues on 4G Wireless Networks]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6336699]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[The authors give an overview on the state of the art of potential security issues that occur in the deployment of the LTE/SAE (Long-Term Evolution/System Architecture Evolution) protocol in emerging 4G wireless technologies. Although security concerns and challenges in wireless networks will remain a hot topic in the future, the LTE/SAE standard could adapt to these rising challenges, becoming more robust and secure. By looking at the authentication and ciphering algorithms, such as EAP-AKA (Extensible Authentication Protocol for Authentication and Key Agreement), currently operating within the LTE protocol, the authors analyze several vulnerabilities in LTE/SAE security architecture - specifically, insecure AKA key derivation procedures and the lack of fast reauthentications during handovers.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6336699]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>55</startPage>
			<endPage>62</endPage>
			<fileSize>1136</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Bikos, A.N.;Sklavos, N.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[By Executive Order: Delivery of Cyber Intelligence Imparts Cyber Responsibilities]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493325]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[The US, like most countries, is grappling with how to handle cybersecurity issues, especially threats to critical infrastructure. How and where should a government intervene, and which entities have responsibility for notice and action? The authors comment on a recent US Executive Order and its evolution from failed attempts to enact cybersecurity legislation. Although the details are specific to the US, the lessons are applicable to everyone.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493325]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>63</startPage>
			<endPage>67</endPage>
			<fileSize>643</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Trope, R.L.;Humes, S.J.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Time-Outing Internet Services]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493326]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Uncertainty and response time instability can affect invoked Web services' usability, performance, trustworthiness, and dependability. To resolve uncertainty, researchers have applied a three-pronged approach. First, they remove uncertainty through advances in data collection, response time measurement, and benchmarking. Second, they employ a mathematical foundation for modeling uncertainty. Finally, they improve fault-tolerance techniques by making well-considered choices of time-outs and trade-offs between cost, availability, trustworthiness, and performance.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493326]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>68</startPage>
			<endPage>71</endPage>
			<fileSize>352</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Gorbenko, A.;Romanovsky, A.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Authorship Is Continuous: Managing Code Plagiarism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493327]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Code plagiarism is an increasing problem in computer science courses. To deal with this problem, the Vipassana software tool gives instructors improved visibility into their students' programming process.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493327]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>72</startPage>
			<endPage>74</endPage>
			<fileSize>182</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Koss, I.;Ford, R.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[What Happened to the Crypto Dream?, Part 1]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493328]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[One way to use cryptography for privacy is to tweak various systems to be privacy-preserving. But the more radical cypherpunk movement sought to wield crypto as a weapon of freedom, autonomy, and privacy that would fundamentally and inexorably reshape social, economic, and political power structures. This installment of On the Horizon primarily examines the latter use.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493328]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>75</startPage>
			<endPage>76</endPage>
			<fileSize>131</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Narayanan, A.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[A Shortage of Privacy Engineers]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493329]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Companies have an urgent need for trained privacy engineers who can hit the ground running. New courses and degree programs are needed to train students for these privacy engineering jobs.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493329]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>77</startPage>
			<endPage>79</endPage>
			<fileSize>358</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Cranor, L.F.;Sadeh, N.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Network Service Authentication Timing Attacks]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493330]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[The common wisdom is that string comparison timing attacks against a hashed password are impossible. However, these attacks can still be effective if attackers give up on the ideal of stealing all the characters representing the user's password or the entire hash.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493330]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>80</startPage>
			<endPage>82</endPage>
			<fileSize>733</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Hayes, A.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Avoiding a War on Unauthorized Computation]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493332]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Any attempt to regulate-or, indeed, legally define-exploits will cause irreparable harm to both coder freedoms and consumer systems' trustworthiness. It will reduce the sum of our knowledge about how systems can and cannot behave-and thus of what they can and cannot be trusted with.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493332]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>83</startPage>
			<endPage>88</endPage>
			<fileSize>177</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Bratus, S.;Shubina, A.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[When Does Targeting Make Sense for an Attacker?]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493334]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[How do so many Internet users escape harm? The range of attacks is enormous and growing; we know that most users neglect even basic defense measures. Yet things somehow muddle along: 2 billion people use the Internet and seem to derive more good than harm from it. If security is only as good as the weakest link, why don't worst-case outcomes happen regularly? Why isn't everyone hacked every day? The answer might lie in economics rather than technology.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493334]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>89</startPage>
			<endPage>92</endPage>
			<fileSize>940</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Herley, C.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Complementary Perspectives on Privacy and Security: Economics]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493335]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Economics and behavioral economics offer different but complementary approaches to understanding privacy and security. This article explains briefly their differences and similarities, and why they matter in our thinking about security and privacy.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493335]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>93</startPage>
			<endPage>95</endPage>
			<fileSize>999</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Acquisti, A.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[IT for Oppression]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493336]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[The Internet is becoming a tool for oppressive governments. Whether it's Syria using Facebook to help identify and arrest dissidents or China using its &#x0022;Great Firewall&#x0022; to limit access to international news throughout the country, repressive regimes all over the world are using the Internet to more efficiently implement surveillance, censorship, propaganda, and control. They're getting really good at it, and the IT industry is helping.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493336]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>96</startPage>
			<endPage>96</endPage>
			<fileSize>313</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Schneier, Bruce;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Magazine subscribe house advertisement]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493340]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Magazine Subscribe House Advertisement]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[March-April  2013]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://null/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6493340]]></guid>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>c4</startPage>
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			<fileSize>1583</fileSize>
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