<![CDATA[ IET Information Security - new TOC ]]>
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TOC Alert for Publication# 4149673 2016June 23<![CDATA[Dynamic cube attack on Grain-v1]]>38.]]>104165172301<![CDATA[Leakage-resilient message authentication code scheme based on hidden identity weak hash proof system]]>et al. initiated the formal study of leakage-resilient message authentication code (MAC) and presented a MAC scheme that is both leakage resilient and unforgeable against chosen message and no verification query attack (uf-cm-nvq). As the communication overhead of their construction is linear with the parameters that control the leakage bound, their scheme sacrifices efficiency in exchange for leakage resilience. In this study, the authors study the problem of designing leakage-resilient MACs in the public-key setting with acceptable communication efficiency. In particular, a notion called ‘hidden identity weak hash proof system’(HID-wHPS) is introduced. Then a generic MAC construction is presented under the abstraction framework of HID-wHPS. Security properties guaranteed by HID-wHPS enable us to prove the author's construction to be both leakage resilient and uf-cm-nvq in a modular way. Finally, performance analysis shows that their MAC construction yields improved tagging-key size, tag size as well as computation overhead under the given leakage bound.]]>104173179175<![CDATA[Effective certificate revocation scheme based on weighted voting game approach]]>ad hoc networks (MANETs) are wireless networks that have a wide range of applications because of their dynamic topologies and ease of deployment. Owing to the independent and dynamic nature of mobile nodes, the topology of a MANET often changes and is prone to various attacks. Therefore, substantial research in the area of security is required. Certificate revocation is an effective mechanism for providing network security services. However, the existing schemes are not well suited to MANETs because of their considerable overhead or low accuracy with respect to certificate revocation. In this study, the authors investigate a distributed certificate revocation protocol. On the basis of the game-theoretic model, they design a new voting-based security scheme. Their game-based security paradigm can provide the ability to practically respond to the current system conditions and is suitable for real MANET operations. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness and the efficiency of their scheme with respect to certificate revocation. Finally, they discuss the results of an evaluation provide an outlook on the future work in this field.]]>104180187638<![CDATA[Privacy failure in the public-key distance-bounding protocols]]>104188193358<![CDATA[Cryptanalysis of McEliece cryptosystem variants based on quasi-cyclic low-density parity check codes]]>et al. which uses quasi-cyclic low-density parity check (QC-LDPC) codes. This cryptosystem is still unbroken as no efficient attack has been reported against it since 2008. In this study, an attack has been applied to this cryptosystem which is feasible when the code length is a multiple of a power of 2. Also an important weakness of this kind of cryptosystem has been pointed out, namely utilising a too low-weight intentional error vector. The authors have established a new security level for this cryptosystem which is applicable to other McEliece-like cryptosystems using QC-LDPC codes. This security level for instance is 2^{9.18} times lower than previous ones in the case of n = 4 × 4096 when only one ciphertext is available. The gain of the attack in this study can be increased if more than one ciphertext is available.]]>104194202198<![CDATA[Design and formal verification of a cloud compliant secure logging mechanism]]>1042032141486<![CDATA[Multidimensional zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis of the block cipher KASUMI]]>FL, FO and FI functions, the authors select some special input/output masks to refine the general 5-round zero-correlation linear approximations and propose the 6-round zero-correlation linear attack on KASUMI. Moreover, under the weak key conditions that the second keys of the FL function in rounds 2 and 8 have the same values at 1st-8th and 11th-16th bit-positions, they expand the attack to 7-round KASUMI (2-8). These weak keys take 1/2^{14} of the key space. The new zero-correlation linear attack on the 6-round needs about 2^{118} encryptions with 2^{62.9} known plaintexts and 2^{54} bytes memory. For the attack under weak keys conditions on the last 7 rounds, the data complexity is about 2^{62.1} known plaintexts, and the time complexity is about 2^{110.5} encryptions, and the memory requirement is about 2^{85} bytes.]]>104215221593