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TOC Alert for Publication# 4149673 2016December 05<![CDATA[Guest Editorial]]>106287287360<![CDATA[Public-key encryption indistinguishable under plaintext-checkable attacks]]>de facto security notion for public-key encryption. However, this sometimes offers a stronger security guarantee than what is needed. In this study, the authors consider a weaker security notion, termed as indistinguishability under plaintext-checking attacks (IND-PCA), in which the adversary has only access to an oracle indicating whether or not a given ciphertext encrypts a given message. After formalising this notion, the authors design a new public-key encryption scheme satisfying it. The new scheme is a variant of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme with shorter ciphertexts. Its security is also based on the plain decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. Additionally, the algebraic properties of the new scheme allow proving plaintext knowledge using Groth-Sahai non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs or smooth projective hash functions. Finally, as a concrete application, the authors show that, for many password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) schemes in the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway security model, they can safely replace the underlying IND-CCA encryption schemes with their new IND-PCA one. By doing so, they reduce the overall communication complexity of these protocols and obtain the most efficient PAKE schemes to date based on plain DDH.]]>1062883032864<![CDATA[Selective opening security of practical public-key encryption schemes]]>1063043184153<![CDATA[Adaptive proofs of knowledge in the random oracle model]]>not adaptively secure. As for the second result, they prove that an existing construction due to Fischlin (Crypto 2005) yields adaptively secure simulation-sound PoKs in the ROM. Since the purpose of this work is to motivate and introduce adaptive proofs, they only briefly discuss some applications to other areas, for example that adaptive proofs seem to be exactly what one requires to construct chosen-ciphertext attack-secure public-key encryption from indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack secure schemes.]]>1063193312567<![CDATA[Divisible e-cash made practical<xref ref-type="fn" rid="FN1" />]]>n units from a bank, but then to spend it in several times to distinct merchants. In such a system, whereas users want anonymity of their transactions, the bank wants to prevent, or at least detect, double-spending, and trace defrauders. While this primitive was introduced two decades ago, quite a few (really) anonymous constructions have been proposed. In addition, all but one were just proven secure in the random oracle model, but still with either weak security models or quite complex settings and thus costly constructions. The unique proposal, secure in the standard model, appeared recently and is unpractical. As evidence, the authors left the construction of an efficient scheme secure in this model as an open problem. In this study, the authors answer it with the first efficient divisible e-cash system secure in the standard model. It is based on a new way of building the coins, with a unique and public global tree structure for all the coins. Actually, they propose two constructions which offer a tradeoff between efficiency and security. They both achieve constant time for withdrawing and spending amounts of 2^{ℓ} units, while allowing the bank to quickly detect double-spendings by a simple comparison of the serial numbers of deposited coins to the ones of previously spent coins.]]>1063323471824<![CDATA[Bootstrapping BGV ciphertexts with a wider choice of <italic>p</italic> and <italic>q</italic>]]>q^{+} over the finite field F_{p}, followed by polynomial interpolation of the reduction mod p map over the coefficients of the algebraic group. This technique is then extended to the full BGV packed ciphertext space, using a method whose depth depends only logarithmically on the number of packed elements. This method may be of interest as an alternative to the method of Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert (CRYPTO 2013). To aid efficiency, the authors utilise the ring/field switching technique of Gentry et al. (SCN 2012, JCS 2013).]]>1063483571008<![CDATA[Strongly-optimal structure preserving signatures from Type II pairings: synthesis and lower bounds]]>1063583711844<![CDATA[Low Noise LPN: Key dependent message secure public key encryption an sample amplification]]>1063723852582<![CDATA[Public key cryptosystems secure against memory leakage attacks]]>et al. work, but the message space is much larger and the proof is more concise benefiting from the RSM assumption. Instantiating the construction with the QR assumption, the authors get the first QR-based auxiliary-input secure PKE with a larger message space than {0,1}. Moreover, the authors generalise the Goldreich-Levin theorem to large rings. This theorem helps to improve the construction to achieve the same security level with fewer public parameters and shorter ciphertexts compared with Brakerski et al. work. For the bounded-memory leakage resilient security, the construction can achieve leakage rate of 1 - o(1) and avoid the dependence between the message length and the amount of leakage. Based on the general construction, the authors also can achieve both bounded-memory leakage resilient chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) security and the auxiliary-input leakage resilient CCA security via the well-known Naor-Yung paradigm.]]>106403412992<![CDATA[Method for detecting text information leakage in electromagnetic radiation from a computer display]]>1064134172859<![CDATA[Exception-oriented programming: retrofitting code-reuse attacks to construct kernel malware]]>any instruction in existing code and chain the instructions in any order to generate malicious programmes. As a result, EOP can provide the attackers with more powerful capabilities and less complexity for building kernel malware.]]>1064184241725<![CDATA[Improved impossible differential attack on reduced version of Camellia with <italic>FL</italic>/<italic>FL</italic><sup>−1</sup> functions]]>FL/FL^{-1} (without the whitening layers) by taking advantage of the intrinsic weakness of keyed functions, the redundancy of key schedule and the early abort technique. Specifically, the authors mount the first impossible differential attack on 13-round Camellia-192 with 2^{124.79} chosen plaintexts, 2^{186.09} 13-round encryptions and 2^{129.79} bytes, while the analysis for the biggest number of rounds in previous results on Camellia-192 worked on 12 rounds. Furthermore, the authors successfully attack on 14-round Camellia-256 with 2^{122.14} chosen plaintexts, 2^{228.33} 14-round encryptions and 2^{134.14} bytes. Compared with the previously best known attack on 14-round Camellia-256, the time and memory complexities are reduced by 2^{9.87} times and 2^{46.06} times, and the data complexity is comparable.]]>1064254321867<![CDATA[Hyperchaotic system-based pseudorandom number generator]]>1064334412768<![CDATA[Security of weak secrets based cryptographic primitives via the Rényi entropy]]>106442450885