Truthful spectrum auction for efficient anti-jamming in cognitive radio networks

One significant challenge in cognitive radio networks is to design a framework in which the selfish secondary users are obliged to interact with each other truthfully. Moreover, due to the vulnerability of these networks against jamming attacks, designing anti-jamming defense mechanisms is equally important. In this paper, we propose a truthful mechanism, robust against the jamming, for a dynamic stochastic cognitive radio network consisting of several selfish secondary users and a malicious user. In this model, each secondary user participates in an auction and wish to use the unjammed spectrum, and the malicious user aims at jamming a channel by corrupting the communication link. A truthful auction mechanism is designed among the secondary users. Furthermore, a zero-sum game is formulated between the set of secondary users and the malicious user. This joint problem is then cast as a randomized two-level auctions in which the first auction allocates the vacant channels, and then the second one assigns the remaining unallocated channels. Simulation results show that the distributed algorithm can achieve a performance that is close to the centralized algorithm.