Evaluating Cost Allocation Imposed by Cooperative Switching Off in Multioperator Shared HetNets

The anticipated explosion in the total data traffic load will impose to mobile network operators (MNOs) the necessity to densify their networks to provide coverage. At the same time, since MNOs plan their networks according to their high-peak traffic load, base station (BS) underutilization during the low traffic hours raises the issue of unnecessary power consumption and excessive cost. In this paper, we plan to study the energy and cost efficiency of a heterogeneous network (HetNet) that is a cooperation result of many MNOs. Each MNO is owner of a HetNet, composed of eNodeBs and small cells and they cooperate by sharing their infrastructure and by switching off a part of it. BS type and traffic load constitute switching off criteria and a roaming-cost-based user association scheme is used to roam traffic to neighboring BSs. We assess the cost alterations created by the possible MNO coalitions and we propose a bankruptcy game to allocate the obtained cost to the cooperative MNOs and to motivate them thus to maintain their sharing agreement instead of following a non-cooperative tactic. The bankruptcy game uses Shapley Value to portray each MNO's contribution to cost savings. The MNOs' satisfaction from their payoffs (i.e., the allocated cost) and the overall fairness of the method are evaluated. According to the extracted results, the proposed switching off scheme achieves significant improvement of energy efficiency for the studied network, while the proposed bankruptcy game achieves a balanced and satisfactory cost allocation for different MNO traffic loads.