QoS-Aware Service Selection Using an Incentive Mechanism

QoS-aware service selection seeks to find the optimal service providers to achieve the optimization goal of a service requester, such as the maximization of utility, while satisfying global QoS requirements. Service providers are usually self-interested and have some private information, such as minimum prices, that would significantly factor into the decision making of the service requester. Thus, service requesters face a decision making dilemma with incomplete information. Recent work has used iterative combinatorial auctions to address this problem. However, such studies do not sufficiently consider that the service requester can elicit the private information from service providers by observing their actions. This can help the service selection process achieve better outcomes. In this paper, we propose a type of incentive contract that can motivate the service providers to offer the QoS and prices that the service requester prefers. Based on the incentive contracts, we propose an incentive mechanism for effective service selection. In the mechanism, a service requester offers a set of incentive contracts to the service providers and then elicits their private information based on their responses to the incentive contracts. The process is iterated until the service requester finally obtains a solution that fulfills the global QoS requirements. Experimental results show that the incentive contracts have a positive impact on both service requesters and providers and that the incentive mechanism outperforms the existing combinatorial auction-based approaches in finding optimal solutions.