Auction-Based Frameworks for Secure Communications in Static and Dynamic Cognitive Radio Networks

This paper investigates the secure communication issue for both static and dynamic cognitive radio networks (CRNs), where multiple nonaltruistic primary users (PUs), secondary users (SUs), and eavesdroppers exist. The design objective is to provide secure communications for PUs and, meanwhile, to ease the starvation of transmission opportunities for SUs. To achieve this goal, we propose a barter-like trading model to incentivize the cooperation among nonaltruistic users. Specifically, PUs leverage the assistance of SUs in the form of cooperative relaying or friendly jamming and, in return, yield certain licensed spectrum accessing time to the aided SUs. We propose a truthful nonmonetary double auction framework (FONDA) toward secure communications for static CRN where PUs and SUs interact in a single round. Then, we extend our framework to d-FONDA for dynamic CRN, where SUs who have patience (tolerant of traffic delay) arrive and leave the network dynamically. We prove that both FONDA and d-FONDA preserve nice economic properties, including truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget balance. Simulation results reveal that the proposed frameworks provide substantial performance gains compared with the baseline scheme and suffer acceptable performance degradation over ideal schemes.