Game-Theoretic Infrastructure Sharing in Multioperator Cellular Networks

The introduction of fourth-generation wireless technologies has fueled the rapid development of cellular networks, significantly increasing the energy consumption and the expenditures of mobile network operators (MNOs). In addition, network underutilization during low-traffic periods (e.g., night zone) has motivated a new business model, namely, infrastructure sharing, which allows the MNOs to have their traffic served by other MNOs in the same geographic area, thus enabling them to switch off part of their network. In this paper, we propose a novel infrastructure-sharing algorithm for multioperator environments, which enables the deactivation of underutilized base stations during low-traffic periods. Motivated by the conflicting interests of the MNOs and the necessity for effective solutions, we introduce a game-theoretic framework that enables the MNOs to individually estimate the switching-off probabilities that reduce their expected financial cost. Our approach reaches dominant strategy equilibrium, which is the strategy that minimizes the cost of each player. Finally, we provide extensive analytical and experimental results to estimate the potential energy and cost savings that can be achieved in multioperator environments, incentivizing the MNOs to apply the proposed scheme.