An optimal dynamic pricing and schedule approach in V2G

Smart Grid (SG) can greatly improve the efficiency and reliability of traditional grid. As a promising feature of future SG, the Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) technique exhibits great potential to balance the supply and demand of electrical power as well as integrate renewable energy. Recently, some V2G-based schemes have been proposed to leverage the energy-storage capability of electric vehicles (EVs) to effectively reduce energy loss caused by supply-demand mismatches. However, most of the existing schemes rely on the assumption that the charge station is profit-neutral, lacking of adequate incentive to the charge stations for wide deployment. In this paper, we investigate a scenario where the charge station is modelled as an entity driven by its own profit. We formulate the interactions between the charge station and multiple EVs as a game, in which two kinds of EVs, cooperative EVs and selfish EVs, are considered. Regarding the intelligence of selfish EVs, a dynamic pricing over multiple time slots is developed from the charge station's perspective to maximize its own profit. Both theoretical analysis and simulation results show that through our scheme of dynamic pricing for selfish EVs and charging scheduling for cooperative EVs, the charge station can maximize its profit while EVs maximize their utilities.