Auction-Based Spectrum Management of Cognitive Radio Networks

Cognitive radio (CR) technology is considered to be an effective solution to enhance overall spectrum efficiency, whereas a primary radio network (PRN) typically does not fully utilize an available spectrum. However, to realize the CR concept, it is essential to provide enough incentives to PRNs and extra revenue to the service provider such that CR mobile stations (CR-MSs) may accordingly utilize PRN spectrum bands, which provides a new challenge for spectrum management. In this paper, we consider a PRN consisting of a primary system base station (PS-BS) and multiple primary system mobile stations (PS-MSs), and we, therefore, construct a CR network (CRN) consisting of a PRN with multiple CR-MSs. We propose a spectrum-management policy framework based on the Vickrey auction such that CR-MSs can compete for utilization of the PRN spectrum bands available for opportunistic transmission of CR-MSs. PRN users are granted incentives at a discounting factor to access spectrum bands and are being compensated for possible operating interference from CR-MSs, whereas the interference is constrained under a tolerance level without losing satisfaction for the PS-MSs. Once CR-MSs are granted spectrum bands, they can utilize the spectrum bands for a certain duration with no spectrum handoff. Consequently, in addition to incentives to the PRN, the overall spectrum utilization, the profit of the service provider, and the opportunity to access the spectrum for the CR-MSs are enhanced to achieve a co-win situation for every involved party in CRNs. Realistic simulations by incorporating pretty bad channel conditions into system operations show the robust operation of our proposed system, which enables the CR concept.