An Explanation of Evolutionary Game Theory for the Circulative Flowed Phenomenon in Chinese Rural Labor Transfer

The famous Todaro model could not explain the circulative flowed phenomenon in the course of rural labor transfer. The paper uses Sethi's generic replicator dynamic model (1998) of evolutionary game theory to explain the circulative flowed phenomenon based Chinese statistical data. It builds the urban-rural ternary-structure model including rural section, urban informal section and urban formal section, which breaks the rural-urban dual-structure limitation of Todaro model. Then it draws the necessary conditions of the asymptotic stable equilibrium (evolutionary equilibrium) and stable focus in the evolutionary function of Chinese rural labor transfer, which the phase diagram of stable focus describes the circulative flowed phenomenon of rural-urban population proportion. At last, it analyses some factors influenced the convergent course, including learning barriers in the urban formal sector and informal sector and rural-urban income gap.