Robust Auction-Theoretic Partner Selection in Cooperative Diversity Wireless Networks

Cooperative diversity is a form of distributed spatial diversity achieved by cooperative communication among mobile users in cellular or wireless data networks. The problem of selecting suitable partners for a cooperative strategy is more complex when prospective partners have links of dissimilar quality to a central destination, leading to the possibility of non- reciprocal cooperation. We analyze self-configuring cooperative wireless networks under conditions of minimal topology and channel link information available to users. For such cases, a robust auction-theoretic mechanism is proposed for the selection of single as well as multiple simultaneous cooperative partners. We characterize equilibrium strategies and revenue for the single-unit second-price auction and its extension, the multi-unit Vickrey auction, under conditions of uncertainty in the number of bidders requesting cooperation. The proposed auction- theoretic selection scheme is shown to be a revenue-maximizing decentralized solution for QoS delivery in cooperative wireless systems.