Games with incomplete and asymmetric information in poolco markets

Strategic equilibrium solutions as a result of gaming by electricity market participants have been the subject of various recent studies. Yet, in many of the tools developed for finding those strategic solutions, either information is regarded as being complete, or the complexities of the transmission system are disregarded. Since the assumption of complete information is neither absolutely correct nor absolutely necessary for the more complex models, these models need to be extended. The strategic solutions attained in these incomplete information or Bayesian games are Bayesian Nash equilibria. The central thrust of the paper is on bringing the representation of incomplete and asymmetric information in strategic games together with some of the transmission system constraints. For this purpose, the paper focuses on a specific strategic game model referred to as the IWM. Numerical examples, using the IEEE 57-bus system, that deal with the power flow equality constraints are presented as an illustration of the concepts behind the proposed Bayesian games.