On the complexity of two-player win-lose games
Abbott, T.; Kane, D.; Valiant, P.
Foundations of Computer Science, 2005. FOCS 2005. 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on
Volume , Issue , 23-25 Oct. 2005 Page(s): 113 - 122
Digital Object Identifier   10.1109/SFCS.2005.59
Summary: The efficient computation of Nash equilibria is one of the most formidable challenges in computational complexity today. The problem remains open for two-player games. We show that the complexity of two-player Nash equilibria is unchanged when all outcomes are restricted to be 0 or 1. That is, win-or-lose games are as complex as the general case for two-player games.

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