A game-theoretic model for generation expansion planning: problemformulation and numerical comparisons
Chuang, A.S.; Wu, F.; Varaiya, P.
Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on
Volume 16, Issue 4, Nov 2001 Page(s):885 - 891
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/59.962441
Summary:This paper presents an application of noncooperative game theory
to generation expansion planning (GEP) in a competitive electricity
industry. The authors apply the Cournot model of oligopoly behavior to
formulate a GEP model that may characterize expansion planning in a
competitive regime, particularly in pool-dominated generation supply
industries. Numerical experiments are conducted on a test system to
analyze generation investment and market participation decisions of
candidate expansion units that vary in costs and forced outage rates.
The numerical results point to: (1) greater industry expansion and
system reliability, under Cournot competition than under centralized
expansion planning; and (2) higher probabilistic measures of reliability
from multi-player expansion than from expansion by a traditional
monopolist with an equivalent reserve margin requirement. Furthermore,
the authors summarize analytical results involving a simplified version
of the GEP game
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